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Highlights 
 Paradigm shift from dependence to diversity emerging throughout the EU 
 EU primary energy supply dependence rising to 58%, mainly driven by transport fuels 
 EU primary energy supply diversity improved by 14.2% (SWI) and 22.6% (HHI)  
 Small countries and islands have high dependence of 96% and low diversity of 0.48.   
 
Abstract 
We evaluate energy supply security in all the EU countries. For the first time a proxy indicators for 
diversity and concentration Shannon Wiener index and Herfindahl-Hirschman index and dependence 
metrics are used for the detailed primary energy fuel mix of all EU member states. The geographic 
coverage of this work allows for useful comparisons between countries and for a means of 
benchmarking against the indices. Overall, it is found that energy supply diversity in the EU has been 
significantly improved since 1990 by 14.2% (SWI) and 22.6% (HHI). We demonstrate the interrelations 
between dependence and diversity and the role of renewables on dependence and diversity. Renewable 
energy, particularly wind, solar and biomass has been the main driver for diversity growth and has a 
positive contribution to indigenous energy use; thus reducing energy import dependence. We argue that 
alongside renewable energy there exists a wide range of factors contributing to energy dependence and 
that renewable energy has had a positive contribution to almost all EU28 country’s diversity.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background on Energy Supply Security 
Access to energy is one of the most important aspects of the well-being and sustainable development 
of modern societies [1]. Mainstream commodities cannot be produced, delivered or used without the 
use of energy. In that context, the role of energy is directly linked to the economic, social and 
environmental development of a country [2]. 
 
The global energy system faces several distinct governance and policy challenges. World energy 
demand is expected to grow by 45% between 2015 and 2030, and by more than 300% by the end of the 
century, necessitating a tripling for infrastructure investment [3]. These figures illustrate the significant 
growth on energy demand globally and in particular within the existing European energy market. The 
depletion of fossil fuel reserves and the increasing demand for clean, affordable and secure energy are 
issues considered under the umbrella of energy security which is therefore an important aspect of a 
country’s economy [4]. 
 
The scope of energy supply security can be challenging to define [5]. The definition of energy supply 
security given by Grubb et al. (2006) [6] and the formal definition of the International Energy Agency 
(2016) could be summarized as “affordable price that does not disrupt the economy is a presupposition 
for a secure energy supply” [7,8]. The term has evolved from the previous simplified approach which 
was based just on resource availability, to a new paradigm that takes into account international trade 
and competitive markets [9,10]. Political stability, market liberalization, foreign affairs and 
environmental concerns are concepts that are strongly linked to the new reality of energy supply security 
[11]. In the case of less developed countries energy security is defined as the access to modern energy 
services [12] but the rise of industrial consumption is emerging economies should not be disregarded 
[13]. 
 
1.2 The case study of E.U 
Energy supply security is complex mainly because of its impacts on every aspect of economic activity 
and its sensitivity to a wide range of uncertainties [14]. The concept benefits from increased attention 
in the recent years and is considered a priority issue in the European Union and Member States’ agenda 
[15]. Rising demand, increased import dependence of European countries, geopolitical tensions along 
with the structural change of commodity markets from regional to global and the need of proper 
regulatory response gave significant importance to the multi-dimensional term of Energy Security [16]. 
 
The objective of the EU to transit to a low carbon sustainable economy premediates a reduction in fossil 
fuels use, both at industrial and household level. In line with COP 21 (Paris 2015) EU set a 40% 
reduction target in emissions compared to 1990 and advocated a binding target of 27% in energy 
efficiency savings [17]. This emissions reduction required sweeping changes in the ways energy is 
produced and used, therefore challenging the availability and accessibility of energy resources 
impacting on the overall energy system resilience [18].  
 
Challenges such as energy resources scarcity, global warming and commodity price fluctuations set the 
agenda for what is known as the “Energy Trilemma” [19]. The EU, a global leader in emissions 
reduction, suffers from a chronic lack of indigenous energy resources which results in higher energy 
prices and an anaemic recovery from the 2008 financial crisis. At the same time, technological 
innovations with the potential to disrupt the energy supply and consumption landscape emerge with 
electric mobility [20], energy storage [21,22], and demand-side management joining large scale 
deployment of renewable energy sources. 
 
Latest European Commission studies show that the EU imports more than half (53%) of its energy with 
a particularly high import dependence on crude oil and natural gas [17]. In addition to the high level of 
dependence on certain energy products the majority of European countries are locked in their reliance 
on a single supplier [23]. This dependence leaves them vulnerable to energy supply disruptions. The 
recent incident of 2014 dispute between Russia and the transit country Ukraine left many EU countries 
with severe gas shortages and propelled energy security back to the top of the EU’s policy agenda. To 
respond to the uncertainty caused after Russian actions in Ukraine, global warming and commodity 
price fluctuations, a series of measures has been initiated with the “Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: European energy security strategy” [15] with 
little progress.  
 
Most of the existing literature on energy sector resilience and sustainability establishes a quantitative 
or theoretical assessment framework [24,25]. Constantin et al. (2007) [26] in their analysis of the import 
dependence of European nations, used dependence and vulnerability indicators to build scenarios based 
on different degrees of supply concentration and diversity indices, focusing only on oil and natural gas. 
Grubb et al. (2006) [6] considered fuel mix diversity in the electricity sector as a strategy against 
interruption of supply. This study along with most other studies, do not consider any economic or 
political aspect that might involve price volatility. Sovacool et al. (2011) [27] and Kruyt et al. (2009) 
[28], proposed composite indices applied on OECD countries, using mainly indicators focusing on oil 
and fossil fuels. More recent studies provide some indicators of the current energy import dependence 
and diversity situation [29] but the majority are based on a brief snapshot using a single diversity 
approach relying on fossil fuels and they do not suggest a benchmark of the diversity indices used.  
 
The lack of benchmarking in resilience metrics has been previously identified by Hickey et al (2010) 
[30] who mentioned that there is no particular range that would indicate satisfactory or insufficient fuel 
diversity. While no mathematically driven response exists to this issue, we address it by evaluating 
energy security metrics for all the EU countries. Our contribution is in providing a real range of values, 
as it exists in the EU countries, which represent a rich variety of fuel mixes. The adopted approach is 
straight-forward and novel. It is straight- forward because we use the most established concepts to assess 
supply security; dependence and diversity. Both are estimated with indices that were previously used 
in the energy security literature and our approach focuses on the primary energy supply; therefore, 
covering all sectors. The novelty of this work is in offering a workable, real-world range of values for 
energy security indices that provide an overview of the comparative energy supply security of EU 
countries and most importantly to facilitate benchmarking for any country. 
 
 
2. Methodology 
Diversity and dependence present two different paradigms of energy supply security [30] and alongside 
other propositions [24,27,28], present a straight-forward approach to resource supply security 
evaluation. It can be argued that dependence has given way to diversity as the dominant security 
paradigm and that the latter is indeed more fitting for an increasingly interconnected world [10]. A 
country’s import portfolio is evaluated based on the variety of suppliers and balance in the volume of 
the commodities imported from each supplier in respect to the country’s fuel mix. For this research the 
two most widely used indices Shannon-Wiener [32–34] and Herfindahl-Hirschmann [6,30] are 
evaluated alongside import dependence metrics. All primary fuel options are taken into consideration, 
as an extension of previous research that has considered specific fuels such as oil and gas or focused on 
the power sector [28,35,36]. 
 
Each fuel represents an option for HHI and SWI. There is no absolute guidance over the appropriate 
fuel mix diversity (as measured by SWI) or concentration (as measured by HHI). Hickey et al. (2010) 
acknowledge that one of the main disadvantages of using the Shannon–Wiener Index in energy supply 
diversity appraisal is that there is no “explicit range of values that would indicate excessive or 
insufficient fuel diversity” [30]. The fact that there are no particular thresholds providing a clear 
benchmarking direction has been previously identified as a general weakness of diversity indices [37], 
which are beyond doubt useful for comparative purposes. 
 
For this research, time series data were sourced from IEA [38] for 65 products which were classified in 
11 categories based on fuel type.  For homogeneity purposes the data were converted in TJ using IEA 
conversion factors [39] where appropriate. The latest available data is for 2013 and for certain islands 
for 2012. For comparison Eurostat import dependence data [23] were also plotted to highlight certain 
issues with import dependence. The main difference is that IEA accounts “international marine 
bunkers” and “aviation bunkers” as export fuels not consumed within the country, on the calculation of 
primary energy supply, although they are imported. Thus, it provides larger import dependence 
compared to Eurostat [29], where “international marine bunkers” are not included in the equation and 
there are no estimates of “aviation bunkers”.  Besides this energy accounting issue, the most recent 
Eurostat data provide information for 2014 which is more recent than IEA, making it a preferable 
database for this manuscript. However, the Eurostat breakdown of energy products does not allow for 
a detailed diversity analysis which is why we have used IEA data for diversity and both IEA and 
Eurostat data for dependence. 
 
2.1 Import Dependence 
Import dependence metrics can be considered as the most commonly used paradigm for calculating 
security of supply especially when it refers to particular fossil fuels such as oil, gas and coal [28,35,36].  
It can provide a simple indicator of supply dependence; however, it is considered more useful in markets 
with perfect competition [28] which is not the case here especially when accessing energy supply 
security [40]. 
 
Hence: 
𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦
 
for which 
 
Net Imports= Total Imports - Total Exports 
 
The calculations were made for each product separately to allow for better evaluation of our findings. 
In that manner, we could cover circumstances where a country might produce an adequate certain level 
of a fuel but import a sub-product of the same fuel due to issues relevant industrial capacity (e.g. lack 
of downstream industry) or short-term shortages especially during winter times where demand for 
energy is higher. 
 
2.2 Diversity Indices 
2.2.1 Shannon–Wiener Index:  
The index is widely used in a variety of contexts such as statistical mechanics, information in 
cybernetics, entropy in thermodynamics, economics [41] and in disciplines of ecology and genetics to 
evaluate diversity in specific genomes and species populations [14]. It was introduced in energy supply 
security by Stirling (1994) [32] to evaluate the diversity of UK electricity supply sector.  
For n number of energy sources (options) available in the energy fuel mix portfolio the Shannon–Wiener 
Index (SWI) is:  
SWI=-∑ 𝑆𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 × 𝑙𝑛(𝑆𝑖) 
Where: 
n is the number of options 
𝑆𝑖 is the proportional reliance on the i
th option. 
ln is the natural logarithm. 
 
For the calculation of the SWI, each primary energy source available in the fuel mix represents one 
option. Each option is added as the percentile of the calculated number. For example, if an option 
accounts for 10% of the total energy mix then it will be treated as 0.10 in the index. 
 
Figure 1: SWI for equal contribution options as number of options grows. 
 
As Figure 1 shows, the minimum value that the index can take is zero when the system relies on one 
option. Since the number of options n>=1 then SWI cannot be negative. A system with two equally 
weighted options will have a diversity of 0.69 (2dp) and so on. The index increases with the number of 
options but the increase rate declines gradually. Grubb et al. (2006) [6] in an attempt to provide 
benchmarking for Shannon-Wiener index, indicated that a SWI value below 1 shows a less diverse 
system relying on 2 or 3 options, where energy supply is more vulnerable to any possible destructions 
and a value above 2 indicates a system with multiple options, more secure to interruptions of particular 
supply components. The diversity is used based on the assumption that each different option is 
independent from each other. 
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2.2.2 Herfindahl–Hirschman Index: 
HHI is an index used in competition economics to measure the concentration, instead of the diversity, 
of the individual market share of the participants. The higher the HHI, the higher the concertation so 
the less diverse is the system examined. Its origin is in ecology where it is known as “Simpson Index” 
[14]. It is used by the US Federal Trade Commission for the assessment of likely competitive effects of 
horizontal mergers [10,42]. 
For n number of energy sources (options), available in the energy fuel mix portfolio, the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) is:  
HHI=-∑ 𝑆𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1  
Where: 
n is the number of options 
Si  is the proportion of option i expressed as a percentage.  
 
The HHI index is calculated by summing the squares of the share of each primary fuel in the 
corresponding fuel mix. For example, an option contributing 30% of the total will be treated as “30” 
and in the index calculation “30” will be squared. 
 
Figure 2:  HHI for equal contribution options as number of options grows. 
 
As Figure 2 illustrates, the minimum value HHI can take is approaching 0 when the system relies on 
infinite options; in economic terms that implies perfect competition. A system with two equal options 
will have an index of 2,500 and so on. The index takes its maximum value when there is only one option 
available and this is 10,000. This connotes that the index ranges between 0<HHI<=10,000. A suggestion 
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from the US Department of Justice sets the benchmark of 1,500 for a competitive marketplace and 2,500 
for a highly concentrated one [43]. Additionally, it illustrates that transactions that may disrupt HHI by 
more than 200 points in highly concentrated markets are more likely to increase market power. 
Similarly, with the SWI index, the assumption that each different option is independent from each other 
is necessary. 
 
2.3. Different Indices and Development of a Benchmark Range 
Although both diversity and import dependence indices are widely used for estimating energy supply 
security most of the literature rules out one of them to be the “best” index to examine the energy supply 
security of a country. Stirling (1998) [41] favours SWI since he finds that HHI disrupts the concepts of 
variety and balance. On the other hand, Cohen et al (2011) points out that SWI gives greater impact on 
the contribution of options and HHI on the number of options [44]. Le Coq and Paltseva (2009) favour 
HHI for EU energy security on the basis that the EU countries have less diverse energy portfolios and 
HHI is better suited to capture those risks [45]. 
 
Grubb et al (2006) for the first time used both indices to forecast the role of renewable energy in 
electricity supply security in the UK [6]. Taking a step further Chalvatzis and Rubel (2015) [14] 
examined China’s electricity portfolio using both methods for a wider range of historical data. Both 
argued that the parallel use of the indices provides a way to discount diversity uncertainties and the 
results of the two indices are consistent (Figure 3). The correlation for equally contributing options is -
0.85 where the large correlation value provides evidence of the two indices’ consistency and the 
negative sign indicates their opposite nature, since HHI measures concertation and SWI diversity. 
 
Figure 3: HHI and SWI for equal contribution options as number of options grows. 
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3. Results 
3.1 Primary Energy Sources Dependence 
European Union member states follow a similar path during the last half century; importing more than 
50% of their primary energy fuels since 1990 with 18 individual countries being locked in that 
trajectory. It is estimated [15] that the EU imports more than half of its consumed energy and around 
50% of its current primary energy mix is based on crude oil and coal. 
  
It is important to have a look at the EU total primary energy supply and the average contribution of each 
country since 1990 in order to gain a better understanding of the trajectories leading to recent results. 
Germany, France and the UK are the countries with the highest contribution to the EU’s import 
dependence (Figure 4). On the other hand, Malta, Cyprus and Luxemburg are the countries with almost 
negligible contribution. Not surprisingly, Germany, France and the UK are also the countries with the 
largest population and GDP in the EU. Almost 47.28% of the EU’s total primary energy supply is used 
by these countries; hence they play a catalytic role in the composition of EU weighted average metrics. 
 
Figure 4: Average primary energy supply contribution in EU between 1990-2013. Data Source: IEA 
 
Energy dependence is estimated with Eurostat (Figure 5a and Figure 6a) and IEA (Figure 5b and Figure 
6b) data. As previously mentioned the main difference between the calculations of the import 
dependence via the two different data sources is that IEA accounts “international marine bunkers” and 
“aviation bunkers” as export fuels not consumed within the country on the calculation of primary energy 
supply, although they are imported. Thus, it provides larger import dependence compared to Eurostat 
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[29], where “International marine bunkers” are not included in the equation and there are no estimates 
of “aviation bunkers”. 
 
Figure 5: Import dependence for countries categorized in higher dependence group. Data Source: (a) 
1990-2014, Eurostat; (b) 1990-2013, IEA. 
 
With the EU average benchmark for import dependence hovering at approximately 55% in the most 
recent years, it is clear that more EU countries are above it than below it. It is reminded that the 
benchmark line occurs as the weighted average for the EU; hence it considers each country’s individual 
contribution in the primary energy supply and its dependence. On the higher import dependence group, 
we can find the five crisis-hit countries and smaller countries such as Malta, Cyprus and Luxemburg. 
Malta and Cyprus present a dependence much higher than 100%, mainly because of their role as 
international trade centres for re-exporting energy products and the fact that they have not yet integrated 
renewable energy within their energy systems [46]. In the case of Luxemburg excess values come from 
its large aviation sector which accounts for 9.42 % of its total primary energy supply. 
 
It is noteworthy that all EU crisis hit countries’ (Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain) import dependence 
appears to decrease since 2009 [47]. This is explained by a shrinkage of energy consumption linked to 
reduced economic activity. This in turn, led to the abandonment of expensive imported energy 
resources. At the same time, growth of renewable energy production facilitated use of indigenous 
resources and reduced imports further. The lowest increase in renewables production is observed in 
Ireland with 28% and 11% decrease in the country’s import dependence since 2008. Ireland is the most 
import dependent country in this category exceeding 80% consistently during the last 40 years. It is 
essential to notice the significant gap between the primary energy import dependence of the examined 
countries. Greece presents the lowest dependence while Ireland is the most import-dependent country 
of that group. One more issue that becomes evident is that Italy and Portugal have always had an almost 
constant degree of dependence, which during the financial crisis they have started reducing. However, 
Greece, Spain and even more Ireland have experienced a strong growth of import dependence between 
1995 and 2005. 
 
Latvia has the biggest improvement since 1990, reducing its dependence by 34% in 2012 according to 
IEA data and by 48% according to Eurostat data. In line with the effects of the 2008 financial crisis the 
country’s energy needs fell by 8.2% in 2009, in relation to 2007, with import dependence remaining 
constant. A significant increase in exports, mainly sourcing from biofuels and oil products, the same 
period, resulted in a reduction of import dependence in 2010. 
 
For the period of 2010-2011 along with economic recovery, import dependence seems to have gradually 
increased mainly because of the increasing import quantities of oil and natural gas fuels by 8.3% and 
35.9% respectively. In addition, total primary energy supply was reduced by 9.1% contributing to 
import dependence increase of 16%. However, the forthcoming year’s hydro production increase 
covered a fair amount of the increased imports quantities reducing natural gas imports and keeping oil 
imports at a constant level.  
Figure 6: Import dependence for countries categorized in lower dependence group. Data Source: (a) 
1990-2014, Eurostat; (b) 1990-2013, IEA. 
 
The EU average import dependence has increased by 8% since 2002. Most of this growth has been 
accumulated between 2002 and 2010 and since 2010 the average has been hovering at approximately 
55%. This increase comes along with a significant increase of 68% of the UK’s dependence since 2001, 
which from a net exporter, has become a net importer of 50% of its total energy demand. The UK 
accounts for 12.14% on average of the total primary energy supply of the EU since 2001; therefore, it 
has a significant impact. UK dependence might be just 6% below the EU average in 2013 but there is a 
trend to reach and even overcome EU benchmark if we consider that the corresponding difference was 
67% back in 1999. The UK has been slow to escape a fossil fuel based energy mix accounting for more 
than 80% of its primary energy supply. The highest level of renewable energy reached in 2013, accounts 
for 5.06% of the primary energy supply with the majority sourcing from offshore wind and biomass 
energy.  
 
Likewise, Denmark has experienced a significant increase (59%) since 2000; however, since Denmark 
accounts for only 1.1% of the EU primary energy supply, the impact on the EU import dependence is 
negligible. North Sea declined production affected both the UK and Denmark. Moreover, Denmark has 
invested heavily in renewable energy sources to mitigate the effects of indigenous fossil fuels scarcity 
[48]. Since 2000, a reduction of 16.6% of fossil fuels has been substituted by a corresponding 15.87% 
growth of renewables, mainly wind and biofuels. Denmark has 13 incentives in force supporting the 
renewable energy sector with particular focus on wind energy making it one of the leading countries in 
renewable energy generation [49]. 
 
 
4. Energy Supply Diversity 
The paradigm of energy independence for supply security is gradually downgraded with the elimination 
of resource nationalism, the depletion of high quality indigenous resources and the emergence of 
international competition. Import dependence is only one aspect of energy supply security. In order to 
develop pathways to a sustainable, decarbonized energy future, diversity of energy resources is, at least, 
equally important [50]. The EU has adopted a long-term strategic approach prioritizing energy diversity 
within the context of climate change mitigation policies in an attempt to reduce its reliance on expensive 
and environmentally damaging fossil fuels [51,52]. Two indices are being used to measure diversity 
and concentration respectively as described extensively in Section (2). 
 
Before discussing the specific results, it is important to mention that while countries use a variety of 
energy resources to meet their needs, the vast majority of their imported energy is oil and gas. When 
countries rely heavily on coal that is because they can meet most of their demand with indigenous coal 
resources. Likewise, for EU countries oil has been the main imported fuel, followed by gas. 
 
In visualising diversity results the 28 countries were split between those with lower diversity (Figures 
7 and 8) and those with higher diversity (Figures 10 and 11) as measured by SWI. In keeping with HHI, 
the countries with higher concentration are plotted separately (Figure 9) from the countries with lower 
concentration (Figure 12). As previously discussed in the methodology both SWI and HHI are sensitive 
to the number of energy supply options which can show disproportionately improved diversity even 
when several of the options have only small contribution. This is the case frequently with new renewable 
energy sources [30]. Normally, all options, even those with negligible contribution, are used to plot the 
results. However, to acknowledge this issue and to provide a means to mitigate it, specifically in the 
case of SWI, additional figures are provided with the index results plotted only for options contributing 
at least 5% (Figures 8 and 11). Moreover, it is clarified that the split between high and low diversity 
(low and high concentration) is based on the EU average benchmark for 2013.  
 
 
Figure 7: Primary energy supply diversity, measured with SWI for all fuel options contributing at 
countries belonging on the lower diversity group between 1990-2013. Data Source: IEA. 
 
Figure 8: Primary energy supply diversity, measured with SWI for options contributing more than 5% 
at countries belonging on the lower diversity group between 1990-2013. Data Source: IEA. 
 
 
Figure 9: Primary energy supply concentration, measured with HHI for all fuel options at countries 
belonging at the higher concentration group between 1990-2013. Data Source: IEA. 
 
The EU significantly improved its diversity with an increase of SWI by 14.2% and decrease of HHI by 
22.6% since 1990. This improvement accelerated after 2002 along with the increase in oil prices and 
the wider use of renewable energy sources by all member states. However, this growing trend is stronger 
when all options are included (Figures 7 and 9) and weaker when only >5% options are included (Figure 
8). This indicates that a large proportion of diversity growth relies on underdeveloped options and more 
specifically renewable sources of energy which play a small role in national fuel mix. This discrepancy 
on the benchmark line should not take away from the fact that diversity is improving across the EU. In 
fact, the aforementioned <5% renewable energy options have a growing trend which will result in 
significantly more robust diversity improvements in the next few years. The main drivers for diversity 
growth have been reduction in transport fuel use and increase in renewable energy sources. Those trends 
help balance the total fuel mix and increase the diversity metrics.  
   
Cyprus, Malta, Estonia and Luxemburg are the counties with the least diverse fuel mix. These countries 
share similar characteristics such as small total primary energy supply, small population and land area, 
compared to the rest of EU countries. Moreover, there is no evidence that the primary energy diversity 
of these countries converges with that of the rest of the EU. It is also important to note that the total 
average contribution of these four countries to the EU total primary energy supply is 0.72%, meaning 
that their low diversity does not affect the total picture of EU supply diversity. 
 
France, as the country with the second largest primary energy supply and third largest economy of the 
EU, has a relatively low diversity. France accounts for 14.8% of the EU’s total primary energy supply 
for the last 26 years. Its primary energy supply relies mainly on nuclear energy, as it has an enormous 
net capacity of 63,130 MWe, six times larger than that of Germany, which is the second largest [53]. 
There is no significant improvement in France’s diversity, over time. In fact, diversity gets worse until 
2006 and then is improved until it reaches the same level with 1990. Improvement from 2006 onward 
is linked to increase in renewable energy sources particularly biofuels and waste energy and a 
substantial decrease of crude oil and petroleum products (Figure 12). However, France’s heavy reliance 
on nuclear energy is a source of vulnerability for the EU electricity market as it has been evidenced 
after the recent unplanned closure of EDF’s several reactors for inspection and maintenance [54]. 
 Figure 10: Primary energy supply diversity, measured with SWI for all fuel options at countries 
belonging on the higher diversity group between 1990-2013. Data Source: IEA. 
 
Figure 11: Primary energy supply diversity, measured with SWI for fuel options contributing more than 
5% at countries belonging on the higher diversity group between 1990-2013. Data Source: IEA. 
  
Figure 12: Primary energy supply concentration, measured with HHI for all fuel options at countries 
belonging on the lower concentration group between 1990-2013. Data Source: IEA. 
 
The Scandinavian countries are in the higher diversity range group (Figures 10 and 12). In Finland, coal 
and petroleum products supply has been below 50% since 1998, following a declining path which 
reached its lowest level of 37.8% in 2013. The rest of the country's primary energy supply is met with 
nine different options out of the 11 sub-categories we have used, since 2013. As SWI provides great 
sensitivity on the number of options, we can see that the corresponding diversity drastically decreases 
when we do not include options with contribution lower than 5%. Significantly, biofuels and waste are 
the leading primary energy source in Finland since 2012, followed by crude and petroleum products 
and nuclear. Sweden’s diversity follows a more stable pattern with low reliance on fossil fuels, 
constantly below 35% and high reliance on nuclear energy accounting on average 35.36% since 1990. 
Germany, which accounts for 19.81% of the EU total primary energy supply, has increased its diversity 
by 18% since 1990. Although big part of the electricity generated is sourced from renewables, Germany 
is locked in expensive and environmentally damaging fossil fuels. More than 80% of the country’s 
primary energy supply is provided by fossil fuels.  
 
 
5. Discussion  
As previously mentioned there is a paradigm shift from a focus on dependence to a new focus on 
diversity. However, growth in indigenous renewable energy sources is responsible for dependence 
improvements alongside diversity improvements and not instead of them. Using 2012 as a snapshot, we 
have plotted diversity (as SWI for all options) against dependence for all countries (Figure 13). 
Acknowledging that a combination of high diversity and low dependence warrants the most secure 
approach, countries at the upper left corner (Denmark, Romania, Sweden and Czech Republic) are better 
placed to respond to potential perturbations of their energy supply systems. On the contrary, countries 
placed at the lower right corner (Malta, Cyprus and Luxemburg), experience the highest exposure to a 
less diverse and predominantly imported fuel mix.  
 
 
Figure 13: Import dependence (horizontal axis) against primary energy supply diversity (vertical axis), 
measured with SWI for all fuel option at 2012. Data Source: IEA. 
 
Renewable energy is often how countries achieve simultaneous improvements in their fuel mix diversity 
and energy import dependence. However, not all countries that introduce renewable energy in their fuel 
mix experience a reduction in their energy import dependence which is why we have explored this issue 
further. The first observation in Figure 14 is that all countries have increased renewable energy sources 
in their fuel mix. By doing so, some countries such as Denmark, Sweden, Latvia and Estonia have 
reduced their import dependence (upper left corner). At the same time countries at the right side have 
increased their import dependence despite increasing renewable energy use.  
 
These observations do not invalidate that growth in renewable energy contributes to reduction in energy 
import dependence assuming it concerns indigenous renewable energy resources (and not imported 
biomass). Nevertheless, this issue must be contextualised in the complicated mix of parameters that 
influence import dependence. Firstly, in the period of the study renewable energy contributes only to 
the electricity sector which feeds substantially into other sectors but less so in the transport sector. 
Considering that oil and gas are the main imported fuels in across all EU countries growth in private 
vehicle ownership and increased demand for oil derivatives could lead to increased dependence. 
Secondly, some countries have experienced a production decline of their indigenous oil, gas and coal 
reserves during the study period. This may have been a result of reserve depletion such as the case of 
North Sea oil and gas, that has affected the UK, or it might have been a case of abandoning coal use to 
mitigate climate change. Therefore, it is important to clarify that although renewable energy has an 
impact on dependence it is one of the factors contributing to the energy dependence level of the 
examined countries. 
 
 
Figure 14: Import dependence difference (horizontal axis) against growth in renewable energy use 
(vertical axis) for 1990-2012. Data Source: IEA, Eurostat. 
 
Following the discussion over the relationships between growth in renewable energy and growth in 
import dependence (Figure 14), it is necessary to consider the relationships between growth in 
renewable energy and growth in diversity (Figure 15) to gain a complete understanding of the role that 
renewable energy plays on energy supply security. All countries have increased renewable energy in 
their fuel mix and most of them have improved their diversity during the same period (1990-2012).  
 
For example, Portugal (PT) achieved 0.6 improvement in SWI by only adding 1% more renewable 
energy and Latvia (LV) achieved 0.03 improvement in SWI by adding 24% more renewable energy. In 
fact, Portugal achieved that diversity increase by introducing 3 new options to its fuel mix; specifically, 
natural gas, wind and geothermal energy which mostly substituted coal, oil and hydro power. Latvia’s 
renewable energy growth has been mostly attributed to increased use, from 8% to 31%, of biomass 
which substituted coal and oil. This in turn, made biomass a dominant new fuel that had a negative 
impact on Latvia’s fuel mix balance which is reflected in the almost negligible diversity growth. 
Moreover, Malta and Luxemburg added a small share of renewables and experienced a diversity 
reduction. As previously mentioned, Malta shut down its coal power station and substituted it with oil 
which resulted in a drastic fall in diversity. That diversity fall has not been possible to recover which a 
modest addition of renewables. Furthermore, Luxemburg grew its reliance on oil (to almost 60%) which 
hurt its balance and SWI index.  
 
 
Figure 15: SWI index difference (horizontal axis) against growth in renewable energy use (vertical 
axis) for 1990-2012. Data Source: IEA, Eurostat. 
  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
Energy security is important for all countries and substantially more important for countries that are 
simultaneously exposed to multiple supply vulnerabilities. As such, EU countries present a distinct case 
study since ambitious GHGs reduction targets, 2008 financial crisis and the turbulent situation on EU 
peripheries challenge their capacity to strategically secure their energy supply. We have identified that 
the smaller EU countries such as Luxemburg and particularly islands such as Malta and Cyprus present 
both the highest import dependence at 96% and the lowest fuel mix diversity with SWI at 0.48. This 
compares with 58% average import dependence across the EU and SWI 1.44 diversity across the EU.  
 
 On the contrary, Scandinavian countries, particularly Denmark present the lowest import dependence 
at just 13% and Finland the most diverse fuel mix at 1.78 respectively. Independently of the specific 
countries in focus, we contribute a fisheye’s view to metrics of energy supply diversity and dependence 
while we estimate them for all EU countries. This facilitates a straight-forward benchmarking across 
countries with different primary energy portfolios and the contextualisation of the used indices.    
 
In all cases, renewable energy sources are the main driver for the growth of energy supply diversity that 
we have showed across most EU countries. Therefore, increased investment in renewable energy 
sources provides the optimal option to reduce dominance of legacy fossil fuel power stations and grow 
the role of indigenous resources. Clearly, this will have additional benefits in controlling GHGs and air 
pollution and support EU to reach its emissions targets by 20% and 40% in the 1990-2020 [55] and 
1990 and 2030 [56] periods.. 
 
In concluding, it is essential to assess the role of energy and energy security in the broader context of 
the examined countries. Potential negative impacts sourcing from high initial capital investments or 
power prices can be countered within a strategy that makes use of improved energy supply security and 
encourages investment in innovation. This approach should include investment in energy storage 
facilities which can play a bundle of roles at small, facility scale [57], and equally, at larger regional 
scale [58]. Within the energy security literature, the role of energy innovation with technologies 
including various forms of energy storage is not embedded methodologically. Equally, demand side 
dynamics are important and they are driven mainly by the consumer’s preferences. Solutions such as 
introduction of EVs as an alternative to conventional cars in the transport sector could serve as a 
measure to increase diversity decrease dependence and on the same time reduce various pollutants and 
emissions. As there is a positive link between environmental predisposition and reduction of energy 
consumption through the wider use of more efficient and environmental friendly technologies we 
believe that consumer green pedagogy could reduce future vulnerabilities surrounding energy security 
in the long run [59,60]. In this context, we argue that future research should consider how to 
methodologically incorporate advances in energy systems that will include demand side management 
and energy storage technologies. 
 
Certainly, one size does not fit all and each one of the examined countries should focus on the types of 
resources that offer a competitive advantage depending on their geographical location, indigenous 
resources and existing national grids. Acknowledging the role of strategic coordination in energy 
investment and planning, the EU Commission may have to provide leadership. This should fit alongside 
the EU’s agenda for leadership for the abatement of climate change and the burden sharing for emissions 
reduction between the EU States [61].  
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